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Defendant-Appellant Martineau respectfully submits this 
Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Nupetco Associates. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
1. The debt which is the subject matter of this action was 
a loan to the defendant Magic Valley Properties, an Idaho 
partnership. (R. 200). However, at no time was Magic Valley 
Properties served with a summons and complaint in this matter. 
Instead, the only defendant before the court always has been and 
continues to be defendant Leland Martineau. (R. 173). 
2. The offsets and counterclaims of defendant Leland 
Martineau consisted not only of accounting services rendered to 
Michael Strand, his associated entities, and Magic Valley 
Properties, but also for cash invested by Lee Martineau as a 
partner. (R. 421). It is Lee Martineau1s position that Michael 
Strand is a partner and one-half owner of Magic Valley 
Properties, and should therefore, reimburse Leland Martineau for 
one-half of the amount of cash invested (R. 421). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
LELAND MARTINEAU DID NOT STIPULATE TO A 
PERSONAL JUDGMENT 
In its brief the plaintiff repeatedly makes the factual 
assertion and legal conclusion that Leland Martineau stipulated 
to personal judgment being entered against him, and that the 
subsequent order is equivalent to a money judgment. Neither is 
supported by the record, and the defendant vehemently disputes 
both. This issue is at the core of this appeal and cannot be 
resolved by a mere recitation couched in the tone of a 
self-evident truth. 
The first mention of the stipulation in the record is found 
in the transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss dated 
September 3, 1985 (Tr. beg. at R. 154) . The applicable 
discussion begins at line 18 on page 12. 
MR. CAINE: Secondly, I think in a situation 
we have in this case that there was an 
attempt to foreclose on the mortgage, and if 
— if counsel for Mr. Martineau is now saying 
in this proceeding and are willing to 
stipulate that, in fact, there is a $327,000 
debt, that's evidence — even though there's 
not a promissory note, there is a debt that 
is secured by that note — or secured by that 
mortgage, excuse me, and willing to stipulate 
to that, that's fine. We'll stop right now 
and go to Idaho. 
MR. KIPP: We accept it. 
THE COURT: All right. That settles the 
case. 
MR. CAINE: You stipulate that that is 
secured by that property? 
MR. KIPP: We accept it. We accept that 
proffer. 
THE COURT: All right. Well that's what 
we'll do then. 
MR. CAINE: All right. 
THE COURT: We'll stipulate there's a 
$3 27,000 debt secured by the second mortgage. 
That's plaintiff's Exhibit 1. And based upon 
that, this case can be dismissed without 
prejudice, and you can proceed up in the 
state of Idaho. All right. 
MR. CAINE: All right. 
After discussion about the allowability of attorneys1 fees, the 
discussion as to a personal judgment against Mr. Martineau comes 
up again on page 15 at line 6: 
MR CAINE: My client places something here I 
may be taking for granted. We're not — 
we're not foreclosed from the possibility 
when we bring this action, obviously against 
— on the mortgage in Idaho from raising that 
this is still a personal obligation to Mr. 
Martineau? You're not making that kind of 
determination? 
MR. KIPP: I don't understand what you just 
said. 
MR. CAINE: Well I don't either. 
THE COURT: Well, if that property — if you 
foreclose on that property, I would think 
they are allowed — if you foreclose, there's 
a sale, there's a deficiency, you get a 
deficieny [sic] judgment. 
MR. KIPP: Deficiency. They'll have a 
deficiency judgement against whomever are the 
makers, I guess, the testators or signers of 
the mortgage. 
THE COURT: I would think so. I think Leland 
Martineau, Charles Waters, Magic Valley 
Properties — 
MR. CAINE: That's it. That's our 
understanding. 
(R. 165-169). 
It is clear from this discourse that the parties did not 
enter a stipulation that personal judgment be entered against Lee 
Martineau but only recognized that there may be further judicial 
proceedings against the signatories on the mortgage JLf the sale 
of the property was insufficient to satisfy the debt. Mr. Caine 
himself recognized that the issue of Mr. Martineau's personal 
liability was reserved and not precluded by the stipulation. The 
language establishes that the parties stipulated that the 
mortgage was valid; that it secured a debt of $327,000; and that 
Lee Martineau would not raise the lack of a promissory note as a 
defense to foreclosure. (A complete copy of the transcript of 
the Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on September 3, 1985, is 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit "A"). 
The Minute Entry on the stipulation is consistent with this 
verbal stipulation reached in open court and is instructive for 
what it does not say. Pursuant to its terms, the court ordered 
that: 
1. this case is hereby dismissed 
without prejudice; 
2. the parties may proceed in the Idaho 
court; 
3. no fees are allowed as to this case. 
(R. 41). Nothing in this Minute Entry suggests the judgment was 
to be entered against Lee Martineau with a stay of execution 
pending foreclosure. The basis for this omission is the simple 
fact that Lee Martineau did not stipulate to such a judgment. (A 
copy of the Minute Entry is included in the Addendum as Exhibit 
"B") . 
This interpretation is further supported by the Joint 
Affidavit of Carman E. Kipp and William W. Barrett, counsel of 
record at the time the parties entered the stipulation. In 
describing the stipulation, Mr. Kipp and Mr. Barrett stated: 
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4. That as a result of the discussion, 
a stipulation was reached to the effect that 
a lawful mortgage existed that would be 
subject to foreclosure which proceeding would 
necessarily take place in Idaho as to the 
subject property and that the proceeds of the 
sale of the property would be applied to the 
balance which the mortgage secured. 
5. That at no time was there ever any 
consideration of a judgment being entered nor 
was this contemplated in or covered by the 
stipulation. 
6. That the document entitled 'Order 
and Judgment1 dated October 11, 1985, signed 
by the Honorable Scott Daniels, District 
Court Judge, while it is entitled 'Order and 
Judgment' is in fact an order consistent with 
the record and the stipulation which are 
before the court and which are identified and 
discribed [sic] in this affidavit. 
7. That the issues as to whether there 
would be a deficiency after application of 
the foreclosure proceeds, and as to whether 
Martineau was owed accounting and other fees 
by Strand, were not addressed and were 
reserved in the said Order. 
(R. 350-351). (A copy of the Affidavit is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "C"). 
The confusion which the plaintiff seeks to use to its 
advantage only arises later when the order prepared by Mr. Caine 
was entered. It has no indication that it was mailed to Mr. Kipp 
for his approval pursuant to the rules. Plaintiff relies on 
Paragraph 3 of that Order to argue that personal judgment was 
entered against Lee Martineau. Paragraph 3 states: 
3. That pursuant to Section 78-37-1 
U.C.A. (as amended in 1953), that plaintiff 
are required to foreclose said mortgage 
against the property which is located in 
Cassia County, State of Idaho, before 
R 
proceeding against the personal assets of the 
defendant Martineau. 
(R. 51). If this paragraph is interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the oral stipulation reached by the parties in open court 
and on the record and in a manner consistent with the Minute 
Entry, then it can only grant plaintiff leave to proceed against 
Lee Martineau for a deficiency judgment after the Idaho property 
is sold. Even by its own terms, it does not say that plaintiff 
is awarded a personal judgment against Lee Martineau, execution 
of which is stayed pending foreclosure. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that there are no findings 
of fact made by the lower court as a basis for amending the Order 
and treating it as a personal judgment. Instead, the Minute 
Entry and Order simply state that plaintiff's motion to amend the 
judgment is granted. Because there are disputed issues of fact, 
it was error not to make findings upon which to base the order. 
(R. 338, R. 380) . 
Based on the foregoing, the defendant objects to the 
plaintiff's remarks in its Statement of Facts implying that Lee 
Martineau acted intentionally to violate the October 1985 Order, 
especially the following two statements: 
1. "In the Idaho action, Martineau raised numerous defenses 
in an attempt to defeat Judge Daniels' October 11, 19 85 Order and 
Judgment." (See Respondent's Brief at page 10). 
2. "More than two years after the entry of the Order and 
Judgment, after Martineau had thwarted all attempts of Nupetco to 
foreclose on the Idaho property and fulfill the terms of the 
stipulation, Nupetco filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment to 
relieve Nupetco of the obligation to foreclose the Idaho property 
prior to pursuing Martineau on the judgment." (See Respondent's 
Brief at page 11) . 
The ultimate, overriding issue in this case is whether there 
is a legal and factual basis under which to impose personal 
liability on Leland Martineau, There is neither, and it was 
error to grant plaintiff's motion. The Order should be reversed 
and the issue remanded. 
II 
LELAND MARTINEAU HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE 
COURT'S FAILURE TO SET ASIDE THE ORIGINAL 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER ON THE 
BASIS THAT STRAND AND MLK WERE NOT THE REAL 
PARTIES IN INTEREST 
The plaintiff argues that there was no abuse of discretion 
in the Court's failure to set aside the stipulation and Order and 
Judgment of October, 1985 on the basis that Strand and MLK were 
not the real parties in interest. 
The plaintiff first suggests that the substitution of 
Nupetco on April 26, 1989, somehow cures the fact that Strand and 
MLK had assigned the mortgage which was the subject matter of 
this suit to Nupetco on April 23, 1983—over three months prior 
to the filing of the complaint on August 2, 1983. Although 
plaintiff argues that Leland Martineau had notice of the 
assignment prior to entering the stipulation, Lee Martineau 
denies this allegation. Instead, he learned of the assignment 
when Nupetco filed to foreclose on the real property in Idaho 
pursuant to the October order. 
In addition, the sheer number of assignments in this matter 
by Strand and MLK to Nupetco must be noted. The mortgage which 
is the subject of this action was assigned on April 23, 1983 (R. 
66). On both August 12, 1985 (R. 489) and October 7, 1988 (R. 
584), the plaintiffs Mike Strand and MLK assigned all of their 
rights and claims in this lawsuit to Nupetco. On October 18, 
1985, the plaintiffs assigned the Order and Judgment to Nupetco 
(R. 490). If we assume that the initial transfer in April of 
1983 was effective, this action was prosecuted by a party who had 
assigned both the mortgage and claim to a third party entity. It 
is curious to note that while plaintiff argues that it was not 
error to allow Strand and MLK to proceed despite the assignment 
to Nupetco, the plaintiff also argues (for the purposes of 
precluding Lee Martineau1s offsets and counterclaims) that an 
assignor may not utilize any claim that he has assigned for his 
own benefit. (See Brief of Nupetco pg. 37). 
Lee Martineau was prejudiced by the failure of the real 
party in interest to pursue this action in two ways. First, 
allowing Strand and MLK to assert the claims alleged in their 
complaint after assignment but not allowing Lee Martineau to 
assert his offsets and counterclaims because of his assignment to 
the Hammons-Martineau Partnership is grossly inequitable. The 
stipulation itself reserved the issue of offsets and 
counterclaims. 
Second, Lee Martineau was denied the full knowledge 
necessary to enter the stipulation at issue. It is entirely 
different to settle a case based on an oral contract between the 
parties to an action and to settle a case on an oral contract 
between one party and an assignee of the other. This is 
especially true where the oral contract is alleged to be secured 
by a mortgage on real property which would simply be invalid 
without a written note. As set forth in the case of Shaw v. 
Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952): 
The reason the defendant has the right to 
have a cause of action prosecuted by the real 
party in interest is . . . [to] permit the 
defendant to assert all defenses or 
counterclaims against the real owner of the 
cause. 
Id. at 748. 
Judgment has been entered against Lee Martineau without his 
consent and without trial on the issues, and he has been 
precluded from asserting his offsets and counterclaims which 
would have the effect of negating almost the entire amount of 
that judgment. This is especially egregious in light of his 
repeated efforts to have all parties and all issues consolidated 
and joined so as to economically and finally resolve the entire 
matter. 
Ill 
LELAND MARTINEAU IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT HIS 
OFFSETS AND COUNTERCLAIMS EVEN THOUGH HE 
ASSIGNED THEM TO THE HAMMONS-MARTINEAU 
PARTNERSHIP 
Finally, plaintiff argues that it was not error to grant 
9 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment precluding Lee Martineau 
from asserting his offsets and counterclaims based on his 
assignment of them to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership• 
This issue was first raised by the plaintiff on the morning 
of trial on the offsets and counterclaims. The parties agreed to 
continue trial to allow each to submit memorandums on the issue 
of Lee Martineaufs ability to assert his claims in light of his 
assignment of those claims to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership. 
The parties also agreed that the respective interests of the 
parties and assignees would "not be assigned, transferred or in 
any way altered." Instead, they would "remain static and 
identical from now down through trial." (Transcript pg. 4 
beginning on R. 697) . 
In his memorandum, defendant Lee Martineau argued that, 
although his claims were now assigned to a partnership, that 
partnership had agreed and authorized him to assert those claims 
in this action. Because there was a stipulation not to disturb 
the status quo, Lee Martineau asked for leave of court to obtain 
such authorization. The request was denied, and summary judgment 
was entered against Lee Martineau. He was thereby precluded from 
asserting his offsets and counterclaims that each party had 
originally agreed to reserve. 
In support of the lower court's dismissal, plaintiff argues 
on appeal that Lee Martineau does not own the offsets and claims. 
Because they are now partnership assets, plaintiff argues 
10 
Martineau cannot assert them for his personal benefit. To 
support this position, the plaintiff cites the companion cases of 
Moss v. Taylor, 273 P. 515 (Utah 1929) and Taylor v. Barker, 262 
P. 266 (Utah 1927). However, plaintiff misinterprets Barker, and 
Moss is distinguishable. Under the facts of these companion 
cases, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Taylor were in an automobile 
accident. Thereafter Waddoups assigned to his passenger, Grace 
Moss, any claim for damages to his car, and Moss brought suit 
against Taylor. However, in a separate and subsequent action, 
Taylor brought suit against Waddoups in the City Court, and 
judgment was entered for Taylor in that action. Waddoups 
appealed to the District Court and while trial de novo in that 
court was pending, judgment was entered in favor of Moss in the 
original action. Thereafter, Waddoups sought to use the Moss 
judgment to estop judgment in his case. Therefore, although 
Taylor v. Barker is cited by the plaintiff as supporting its 
position on assignment, the issue in Taylor v. Barker was whether 
there was an estoppel of judgment. As the Supreme Court of Utah 
itself stated: 
The sole question to be determined, 
therefore, is whether or not Ezra Waddoups is 
relieved of liability to answer to the claim 
made by H. L. Taylor for the alleged injury 
to the Taylor automobile because of the 
judgment secured by Grace A. Moss against 
Taylor. 
Id. at 262, 267. 
It was on this issue that the writer of the opinion failed 
to find authority for Waddoups1 position and not on the position 
11 
of offsets as claimed by plaintiff. In addition, Moss v. Taylor 
is inapplicable as in that case Waddoups assigned his assets to a 
third person and private party. In the case at bar, Leland 
Martineau assigned his assets to an entity in which he has a 50% 
ownership interest. His use of those offsets and counterclaims 
is consistent with the partnership purposes, and it is the intent 
of the Hammons-Martineau Partnership that Lee Martineau be 
allowed to exercise control over these partnership assets and 
claim them in this matter. 
On appeal, plaintiff also argues that Lee Martineau is 
precluded from asserting the offsets due to a lack of mutuality 
of obligation and on the basis that at least one of the claims 
arose after assignment by plaintiff of all claims to Nupetco. 
As an initial matter, defendant wonders which assignment 
plaintiff seeks to use to establish this defense — April 1983; 
August 1983; October 1985 or October 1988? Plaintiff's argument 
that defendant cannot assert claims which are subsequent to the 
pleadings is directly contradicted by Rule 13(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. That Section states: 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after 
pleading. A claim which either matured or 
was acquired by the pleader after serving his 
pleading may, with the permission of the 
court, be presented as a counterclaim by 
supplemental pleading. 
As to plaintiff's argument as to mutuality of obligation, it 
is, quite frankly, irrelevant. Defendant Lee Martineau has 
authority from the partnership to assert the claims at issue, 
including the Hammons judgment against Michael Strand• At all 
times there was mutuality of the offsets and counterclaims 
between the original parties, and plaintiff never raised this 
issue prior to the assignment to the partnership. In fact, 
plaintiff admits that the assignment to Nupetco was made subject 
to these claims and offsets. The assignment to the 
Hammons-Martineau Partnership does not negate this. 
Finally, plaintiff also argues defendant cannot assert 
amounts owing to Martineau & Company on the basis that this 
entity is also a partnership. The plaintiff is simply in error, 
because Martineau & Company was originally a sole proprietorship 
of Leland Martineau. After he sold a 10% interest in the profits 
of the business to a business associate, he retained full 
ownership of all assets, including accounts receivable (R. 509). 
Therefore, the lower court erred in precluding Leland 
Martineau from asserting his counterclaims and offsets or from 
joining all parties together in this action to resolve all issues 
in a judiciously expedient manner in the face of defendant's 
repeated requests to do so (See for example the Motion to 
Consolidate R. 343 and Affidavit of John C. Green R. 318) At the 
very least, the foregoing creates material issues of fact 
precluding summary judgment. Therefore, the Order granting 
plaintiff's motion and precluding the offsets and counterclaims 
should be reversed, and the issues remanded for trial on the 
merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in failing to set aside the Order and 
Judgment of October 11, 1985 on the basis that Mike Strand and 
MLK were not the real parties in interest; in granting 
plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment to allow plaintiff to 
treat that Order as a personal judgment against Leland Martineau; 
and in granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to 
preclude Leland Martineau from asserting his offsets and 
counterclaims. Each of these rulings should be reversed and the 
case remanded for a full trial on the issues. 
Respectfully submitted this^g7^> day of March, 1990. 
SN (USB-#1242) 
KIM M. LUHN (USB #5105) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: We're proceeding in the case of 
Michael W. Strand and MLK Investments verses f'artineau, 
4 | C-83-56S0. 
I believe the first order of business is your 
motion, Mr. Barrett? 
MP. EPJRRETT: Your Honor, \;e brought this before yoii 
this morning and discussed it briefly. Ihe position that i/ejve 
taken with respect to this matter is that we recognize the 
$100,000.00 at issue as to what the purpose and what the 
intent of that particular money was for and to be used 
for and hope it was what was to be received and returned 
for that. Therefs a balance owing for $327,989.25. 
THE COURT: Plus interest. 
MR. BARRETT: Plus interest. JLr.d if the second 
mortgage, which was Plaintiff fs Exhibit Y.o. 1, which is 
now before the court is the security for that amount of 
money under what has been termed by cur Supreme Court, 
the single action statute and that would be Section 78-37-1 
of the Utah Code and it's -- and the following statute Section 
78-37-2, this statute in essence says, and I think you 
probably had the opportunity to read it, there can be--
quote, "There can be one action for the recovery of any 
debt or the enforcement of any rights secured solely by 
mortgage upon real estate, which action must be in 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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1 accordance with the provisions of this chapter.11 
2 In essence what this statute provides is that 
3 if you have a mortgage, that mortgage must be foreclosed, 
4
 sold at a Sheriff's Sale. Then in the event there is a 
5 deficiency, that deficiency can be included as a judgement 
6 against the mortgage. 
7 In this situation Mr. Stcsnc ':as not chosen 
8 to foreclose on this second mortgage. He sued on what 
9 he has alleged is a debt. And it's our position that he 
10 just can't do that under some single action statute. That 
11 he has to first foreclose and be awarded a foreclosure 
12 judgement, and the property then must be sold. And then 
13 if there's a deficiency, he can go after Mr. Martineau 
14 or I suppose, any of the other people who may have an 
15 interest in the partnership for that deficiency. 
16 I gave you a copy of one case which was Bank 
17 of Ephraim verses Davis. I found another case which is an 
18 older case, but the net effect is that this single action 
19 statute has been around for a lone, long time. In fact, 
20 in Bank of Ephraim case cites a case as I recall that w a s 
21 decided back in 1098. 
22 This other case that I have, which is First 
23 National Bank of Coalville verses Bowling, was an action 
24 where foreclosure action was filed by the First National 
25 Bank of Coalville and the defendants failed to answer the 
1 complaint, and so the clerk entered a default judgement. 
2 The mortgagor then filed a motion to quash a 
3 writ of attachment that had been issued subsequent to the 
4 entry of the default judgement. And the court, the lower 
5 court denied the motion to quash the writ of attachment, 
6 so writ of certiorari was requested of the Supreme Court. 
7 They took jurisdiction and reviewed the case. They cite 
8 I the predecessors cf 78-37-1 and 78-27-2 :;hich are sections 
9 104-55-1 and 104-55-2 of the revised statutes of Utah 1933 
10 to compare the language. The language is essentially the 
11 same. It's been unchanged. 
12 I think when they recodified, they changed the 
13 numbering system, but the statute as fa:: as the language 
14 contained therein, has not been changed. 
15 The court in taking a lcck at these two statutes 
16 that I refer to, you know, under Title 78 say this, and I 
17 quote, " We have held that under these sections, there is 
18 no personal liability by the mortgager until after foreclosu:} 
19 sale of the security. And then and enly for the deficiency 
20 remaining unpaid and that mortgagee may not have a personal 
21 judgement against the mortgagor until the security has 
22 first been exhausted"--" it has been first exhausted." I added 
23 an extra- word there. 
24 And I think that's the position we're takinq 
25 here. There is no way that I'r. Strand is entitled to a 
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personal judgement against Mr. Martineau on this three 
hundred thousand dollar plus • until he forecloses on that 
second mortgage and until that property is sold. And then 
if there's a deficiency, he'll have a judgement against him 
personally for the deficiency. 
The Bank of Ephraim case essentially says the sam^ 
thing. And it's our position that based on that, the amount 
prayed for, at least the difference between the hundred 
thousand and the three hundred thirtv-seven thousand should 
be dismissed. 
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: believe your client, 
6 
s, 
1 and I believe it was an investment, then he doesn't owe the 
2 hundred thousand dollars to Mr. Strand, right? 
3 I1R. BARRETT: That fs right. That's right. 
4 THE COURT: If I believe Mr. Strand's position 
5 that it was a loan, then he owes it. But your position is 
6 even though he owes it, he can't get it until he's exhaustecj 
7 the security. So you're moving to dismiss the entire 
8 action? is that right? 
9 KR. BARRETT: If you are willing to buy that, Your 
10 Honor, yes, I think as we have discussed in chambers before, 
11 we recognize that we have a problem, at least as to the 
12 $100,000.00 because there are factual issues there. 
13 As far as any subsequent leans that were made, 
14 I don't think we're disputing that. I den't think we're 
15 disputing the amount alleged in the complaint. And 
16 obviously, if you were to believe that the hundred thousand 
17 was a loan, then this case is over. And if you believe that, 
18 there are some problems with respect to that hundred 
19 thousand, and you want to hear more evidence, then at least 
20 as to that, I don't think you can do anythinq. 
21 But I think as far as the balance owing — I 
22 suppose the dilemma you are faced with is that you can either 
23 rule now and throw the whole thing cut if you choose that 
24 approach, or you can take this under advisement, hear the 
25 evidence on the hundred thousand collars and make your 
4 
1
 decision based on that 
2 THE COURT: How could I possibly consistently 
3
 j throw out the three hundred twenty seven dollar lawsuit 
saying they have to exhaust their security first without 
5
 I also dismissing the hundred thousand dollars? I don't see 
6
 how I can consistently because a diversion cf the facts 
7
 wouldn't lend itself to that result, it seems to me 
8 MR. KIPP: Your Honor, J t\ink that aoes a little 
9
 beyond what the briefing was done, and I apoloqize for also 
10 speaking, but that part of it I think is in my area of this 
11 case. And the ansvTer is we think we1 re entitled to win as 
12 a matter of law on whatever amount is covered by the mortgag^ 
13 if the hundred is not covered by the mortgage, they can't 
14 beat us on the hundred because it!s an investment that we 
15 don't owe him. I think — 
16 j THE COURT: That's 
MR. KIPP: I think that's what you said 
THE CGURT: Yeah. 
MR. KIPP: Either it's a loan, the whole thing 
is a loan, in which you handle by the government of the 
21 | law which he says here on ic or it's not a loan and 
22
 ' therefore not a lien, the hundred 
23 I THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Caine 
24
 MR. CAIi:C: The court now has the document in 
25
 front of it that I'll be referrino. to 
17 
18 
19 
20 
1 If it please the court, I have a number of, I 
2 suppose, responses to this, I think,that needs to be said. 
3 Number one, I think first of all to some extent 
4 it addresses the timeliness of bringing this motion on the 
5 day of the trial. This matter has been pending for two 
6 years; the complaint as Mr. Kipp indicated, a little 
7 earlier when we talked about some additional checking 
8 found has not been amended in any way, form and the 
9 allegations have not changed. 
10 And so then on the morning of the trial, we 
11 now have the defendant coming forward claiming "V7ell, you 
12 didn't foreclose the mortgage, so you're birred." I think the 
13 court needs a little bit of background as to what has gone 
14 on in this case before you can make a decision. 
15 I will make a proffer of some testimony that I 
16 have. Dan Jackson, who is an attorney at law here in Salt 
17 Lake City, is here to give, if we need to, and that W:S 
18 these parties did, in fact, initiate a lawsuit to foreclose 
19 this second mortgage in the State of Idaho prior to this 
20 suit being initiated here. That suit was dismissed based 
21 upon, really, a sipulation of all the parties wherein it 
22 was determined that under Idaho law, this second mortgage 
23 in fact really isn't a mortgage because there's no underlying 
24 note and could not be foreclosed. 
25 The court obviously understands that to 
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foreclose— so the court is clear, the property we're talking 
about foreclosing is in Burley, Cassia County, Idaho. 
So foreclosure against real property couldn't lye here* 
It would have to go as an action in rem. 
So they tried to clo that. The case was dismissed 
up there on the basis in effect that all the parties recognised 
that under Idaho 3 aw, this mortgage was defective because 
there's no underlying note. Also, it may very well be defective 
on its face under our lrw or any other lav; when you have 
a comment saying "This is to secure indebtedness between 
the parties in varying amounts in eiccess of $200,000.00." 
It's not clear lo me whether that's a sum certain and can 
obviously be attacked in our own jurisdiction. 
So there's some question to the validity of this 
mortgage to begin with, And I submit \:e have not plead 
either the validity or invalidity of this document as a 
mortgage in this case, but very simply produced this as a 
piece of evidence indicating, if ycu v;ill- as an admission 
against interest, against Mr. Kartineau, that the debt we're 
talking about here is a loan. Just like T.;e > ave introduced 
checks which have the word "loan" en them. Just like 
we introduced other documentation in Mr. Martineau's own 
handwriting which indicate a loan. That's part of the case 
demonstrating a lean. 
Under that extent, this is not being treated 
10 
10 
11 
1 as a mortgage per se, but is evidence indicating an 
2 admission against the interest he has in this case or his 
3 claim, at least, that this, that this is simply an invest-
4 ment. 
5 In addition, the case that's been quoted here, 
6 and I think the court needs to carefully look at that 
7 Ephraim verses Davis, is distinguishable to some extent on 
8 its face, but I think the basic proposition here is correct, 
9 and I don't dispute that. 
This is a case where counsel for the bank went 
in on a prejudgement sort of a situation before he had done 
12 anything, before he foreclosed against the security and 
13 before he filed a suit against the individuals, personally 
14 attempted to attach personal property of the defendant on 
15 the basis that it was about to be removed and all that sort 
16 of thing. The court is familiar with hew that is done. 
17 Then there was a motion to quash that prejudgement 
18 writ of attachment. The court in the Supreme Court said 
19 it should have been quashed in effect because they didn't 
20 go ahead and foreclose against the mortgage, saying in 
21 effect that 78-37-1, which is the mortgage fcreclosure 
22 rule in this state, really goes to the issue of where you 
23 go to get satisfaction and where ycu go if there is a valid 
24 mortgage; is that you, in fact, must sell the securities 
25 secured by the mortgage, the real estate before you look to 
11 
1 a deficiency, 
2 So you really are talking in this case about 
3 judgement types of remedies. And I have no — and I have 
4
 no argument with the fact that if, in fact, we got a judgemerj 
5 in this case against Mr. Martineau or foregone his interest 
6 in this property up there, the first thing we'd have to do 
7 is go up and try to foreclose against that property based 
8 upon a judgement here before we could eye after his 
9 personal assets. And I think that's exactly what this case--] 
10 we have to do --
11 THE COURT: You think you can get a personal judcr^ 
12 ment against someone even though there's a mortgage, so 
13 long as you don't execute on the judgement until you fore-
14 close the mortgage? 
15 MR. CAINE: Yes. I think t^at case allows that. 
16 Secondly — 
17 THE COURT: That's not --
18 MR. CAINE: Secondly, I think in a situation 
19 we have in this case that there was an attempt to foreclose 
20 on the mortgage, and if — if counsel fcr Mr. Martineau is 
21 now saying in this proceeding and are willing to stipulate 
22 that, in fact, there is a $327,000.00 debt, that's evidence--] 
23 even though there's not a promissory note, there is a debt 
24 that is secured by that note -~ or secured by tihat mortgage, 
25 excuse me, and willing to stipulate to that, that's fine. 
12 
10 
11 
12 
13 
23 
1 We 111 stop right now anc go up to Idaho. 
2 MR. KIPP: We accept it. 
3 THE COURT: All right. That settles the case. 
4 MR. CAINE: You stipulate that that is secured 
5 by that property? 
6 MR. KIPP: We accept it. Ve accept that proffer. 
7 THE COURT: All right. Well, that's what we'll 
3 do then. 
9 I MR. CAINE: All right. 
TI-:? COURT: We'll stipulate there's a $327,000.00 
debt secured by the second mortgage. That's Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1. And based upon that, this case can be dismissed 
without prejudice, and you can proceed up i-i the state of 
14I Idaho. All right. 
15 MR. CAINE: All right. 
16 MR- KIPP: Your ^onor, I should be sure that 
17 we're clear about some of the sideline stuff of that. I 
18 don't have their complaint before me. In Idaho the complaint] 
19 and I must say, I don't share counsel's view about 
20 that this becomes unimportant at this point. In Idaho they 
21 scught attorney fees. I think they dc not seel: attorney 
22 J fees h e r e . If they d o , they are not entitled to tliera. 
MR. CAINE: Well « 
24 I MR. KIPP: And they ought to be clea"; -^i the 
25 I record. 
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MR, 
Obviously, our 
total claim in 
MR. 
dispute. 
MR. 
stipulate that 
CAINE: Let me clarify one thing for the court] 
— we're not chanqing our position tnat the 
this case is $427,000.00 and I understand— 
KIPP: I understand that reserves $100,000.00 
CAINE: Okay. if they are willing to 
there's not going to be an issue in Idaho, 
that there's no underlying note, and that the mortgage doesn1 
secure a debt and that the amount they are willing to 
stipulate to is $327,000.00, okay. 
THE COURT: It seems to me the question of 
attorney fees is something you are talking about in Idaho. 
MR. KIPP: Yes. I just don't want attorney fees 
granted here. That's not part of our stipulation. There's 
nothing in this record, nor is there anything before the 
court that empowers them to collect attorney fees in this 
dispute. I don't know what the Idaho law about foreclosure—[ 
whatever the lav; up there — 
MR. CAINE: It allows for attorney fees. 
THE COURT: Right. As to this case, C-83-5680, 
it will be dismissed without prejudice, no attorney fees 
awarded; is that right? 
MR. CAINE: That's what I think he said. 
MR. KIPP: That's correct. 
MR. CAINE: Okay. 
14 
1 THE COURT: All right. Then you'll prepare an 
2 Order to that effect? 
3 MR. CAINE: Yes, I will. 
4 TilE COURT: Submit it to Mr . Kipp for approval 
5 pursuant to Rule 2.9? 
6 MR. CAINE: My client places something here 
7 I may be taking for granted. We're not -- we1re not fcre-
8 closed from the possibility when we bring this action, 
9 obviously against — on the mortgage in Idaho from raising 
10 that this is still a personal obligation to Mr. Martineau? 
11 You're not making that kind of determination? 
12 "ft. KIPP: I don't understand what you just 
13 said. 
14 MR. CAINE: Well, I don't either. 
15 THE COURT: Well, if that property — if you 
16 foreclose on that property, I would think they are allowed— 
17 if you foreclose, there's a sale, there's a deficiency, you 
18 get a deficier.y judgement. 
19 MR. KIPP: Deficiency. They'll have a deficiency 
20 judgement against whomever are the makers, I guess, the 
21 testators or signers of the mortgage. 
22 THE COURT: I would think so. I think Leland 
23 Martineau, Charles Waters, Magic Valley Properties --
24 MR. CAirE: That's it. That's our understanding. 
25 MR. KIPP: The rights that those give to them 
15 
as against parties exist, it's available, the mortgage, the 
amount which is agreed,subject to provisions of Idaho 
law, they can proceed to foreclosure. 
MP. CAINE: All right. I'll di aw the Order, then, 
THE COURT: Thank you. Court will be in recess. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
25 
16 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Susan S. Sprouse, do hereby certify that I am 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah; 
That as such Reporter, I atte-,0ed the hearina 
of the foregoing matter and thateat reported in Stenotype 
all of the testimony and proceedings had, and caused said 
notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing 
pages constitute a full, true, and correct report of the 
same. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of 
September, 1985. 
My Cpmmission Expires: 
rovember 19 85 
MX^r^v. 
Susan S. 
V - >POSUL^U^D 
Sprouse, CSR/RPR 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK 
INVESTMENTS, a Partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LELAND A. MARTINEAU, 
CHARLES WATERS, MAGIC 
VALLEY MOTORS, INC., 
and MAGIC VALLEY 
PROPERTIIES, a Partnership, 
Defendants. 
JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF 
CARMAN E. KIPP & WILLIAM 
W. BARRETT 
Civil NO.: C83-5680 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Affiants being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
1. That they were counsel of record for Leland A. 
Martineau prior to and at the time of the hearing in this cause 
on September 3, 1985. 
i-AHIBIT—C-
nno*ms 
3P AND CHRISTIAN PC 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
CITY C E N T R E I , # 3 0 0 
173 E A S T 4 0 0 S O U T H 
S A L T L A K E CITY, 
U T A H 8<4ill-23l4 
(SOI) 521 3773 
2. That they were not counsel for any of the other 
parties and that that fact was disclosed of record and to the 
Court. 
3. That after the presentation of the evidence and 
testimony by plaintiff, the Court entertained a Motion made 
on behalf of defendant Martineau by affiant William W. Barrett 
during the course of which discussion ensued as reflected by 
the attached transcript. 
4. That as a result of the discussion, a stipulation 
was reached to the effect that a lawful mortgage existed that 
would be subject to foreclosure which proceeding would 
necessarily take place in Idaho as to the subject property 
and that the proceeds of the sale of the property would be 
applied to the balance which the mortgage secured. 
5. That at no time was there ever any consideration 
of a judgment being entered nor was this contemplated in or 
covered by the stipulation. 
6. That the document entitled nOrder and Judgmentn 
dated October 11, 1985, signed by the Honorable Scott Daniels, 
District Court Judge, while it is entitled "Order and Judgment" 
-2-
is in fact an Order consistent with the record and the 
stipulation which are before the Court and which are identified 
and discribed in this affidavit. 
7. That the issues as to whether there would be 
a deficiency after application of the foreclosure proceeds, 
and as to whether Martineau was owed accounting and other fees 
by Strand, were not addressed and were reserved in the said 
Order. 
Further affiants sayth not^ / 
KIPPAND CHRISTIAN*,.&, 
William W. Barrett 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SS 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of 
November, 1987. 
C/3^ 
Notary Public 
Residing at Weber County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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